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CSR practices and conceptions vary across sectors and nations. However, there is a general 
tendency among academics and practitioners to present CSR in Africa as activities 
characterized by philanthropy due to the existence of institutional voids. This review of the 
literature demonstrates that weak institutions lead to weaker bargaining powers designed 
through historical and geopolitical institutional framework of international business and global 
governance systems. Accordingly, MNCs take advantage of such weaknesses to define CSR on 
their own terms by replacing the ideal responsible and sustainable innovations with ad-hoc 
philanthropy that diverts the attention from the negative consequences of neo-liberal µstructures 
of accumulation¶. This is akin to aid that hardly contributes to structural changes but rather 
leads to complacency, corruption, dependency, boutique projects, disguised exploitation and 
misuse of corporate political power to achieve corporate bottom lines.The implications of the 
results are vast and they are generalizable to all weaker institutional settings. Thus, weaker 
institutions create the necessary regulatory, political, economic and governance climate that 
perpetuates a pattern of abuses and ethical violations which are then masked with philanthropy. 
It is argued that the fundamental institutional and geopolitical contexts within which MNCs 
interact with nation states cannot be ignored in any comprehensive analysis that seeks to 
meaningfully shed light on the comparative differences of CSR practices. The neglect of the 
web of contextual, historical, and geopolitical issues in which CSR is entrenched and framed 
diverts attention from the origins of the socio-economic and environmental questions to 
philanthropy as a final solution, which has hitherto been perpetuated with undesirable 
outcomes.  
 
Keywords: Africa, Captured institutions, Comparative CSR, Institutional void, Paradigm 







Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been identified as one of the essential factors for 
business success and sustainable development in the 21st century [1,2]. Indeed, the need to 
foster sustainable development [3] through authentic CSR practices has never been greater 
[4,5]. Foreign direct investments (FDIs) by multinational corporations (MNCs) are a very 
important part of the analysis of development issues [5-7] and political interactions of firms and 
nation states [8,9]. Interestingly, there are complex reasons why the CSR case in developing 
economies is at odds with those of industrialized nations. The issue revolves around an array of 
deep-rooted questions of designed institutional deficiencies, socio-economic disequilibrium, 
environmental turbulence [10,11], historical bias and academic hegemony in defining what 
constitutes good management practices [12-15]. CSR broadly UHIHUVWRWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VVRFLR-
economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary obligations towards society and the environment 
[16,17]. Accordingly, CSR represents ³actions that appear to further some social good beyond 
the interest of the firm and that which is required by law´ [18]. However, within the general 
CSR discourse, there are contextual intricacies, complicated contradictions, knowledge gaps 
and unanswered questions that comparative studies can offer clinical socio-economic diagnosis 
to, while explaining their contours in order to meaningfully expand our understanding. This is 
because CSR must not be actions that appear to be good on the surface but actions that actually 
seek positive socioeconomic and environmental change. In light of the above, this study seeks 
to answer the following question: 
 
How do institutional voids account for the varieties of CSR practices across Africa that 
differ from the CSR practices of highly industrialized nations? 
 
This study problematizes the taken-for-granted assumption that tends to suggest that 
institutional deficiencies in the socio-economic, regulatory and political systems across Africa 
must be solved with mainly philanthropy-based CSR [19-22] and that corporations must step 
in [23] where there are regulatory and governance voids, lack of public utilities and amenities, 
otherwise called the politicization of corporate responsibility [24]. Moreover, the marginalized 
live in the communities where extractive operations take place and water bodies are 
contaminated and forests as a source of livelihood are ploughed down [2,14,25,26]. The proper 
question is, why are gifts not a major feature of CSR in the West [27] but the handouts that 
capture headlines are seen as the desirable direction in developing economies [28] where most 
extractivism [25] and other forms of structural violence takes place [14,25]? The Congo and 
many resource-rich African countries speak volumes of this protracted issue of µplanetary 
vandalism¶ [2] and looting machines [25,26,29] that hardly see accountability [30]. It is this 
LJQRUHG WUDJHG\ DQG WKH LQGXVWULDOL]HG ZRUOG¶V XQTXHQFKDEOH WKLUVW IRU UHVRXUFHV and 
overconsumption which in part fuels corrupt governance and poverty that President Dr. Horst 
Köhler (2014) [31] refers to as µthe impossibility of speaking about Africa¶DQG LWV silenced 
subjectivities and marginalization especially in mainstream journals [12,15]. It makes for an 
uncomfortable reading about how colonial and imperial projects of subjugation and illegal 
appropriation served as the foundations for inequality [13,32-34]. This implies that the 
dominion of the West (spheres of influence) in all geopolitical, economic, regulatory and 
military spheres, and the weak resistance of the rest offers and important analytical clue about 
the genesis of the present state of affairs. This means no sincere inquiry into CSR issues in 
Africa and by extension the developing world can ignore the above crucial analytical factors. 




 Is it possible then that communities in weaker institutions accept philanthropy as a 
substitute for genuine sustainability-oriented CSR because they lack any bargaining 
power or choice that allows them to press home their demands? 
 
Now, the nature of the question is as philosophical as it is empirical. There are, however, other 
conceptual quandaries to be resolved first. This is because knowledge of CSR practices is both 
contextual, perspectival [35], and historically contingent [36]. There is enormous room for 
constructing a comprehensive theoretical framework for explaining how institutions or 
institutional deficiencies shape CSR practices. Are there missing dots in the puzzle that can be 
pieced together to better explain the varieties of CSR practices beyond the institutional void 
hypothesis [11,23,37], or in other words, the lack of government capacity to fix socio-economic 
problems or the lack of enforcement mechanisms [5,20,38]? CSR has political roots [39] and 
these roots must be traced from their exogenous (geopolitics) and endogenous (national) 
politics, mores, polities and institutions [40] which are mostly unaddressed especially in the 
mining sector [41]. More prominently, MNCs now have a bigger role as major actors in global 
governance [42-44]. This particular governance role of capitalist firms in democracies must be 
questioned [2,45,46].  
 
The irresponsible use of corporate political power in influencing local politics [47,48] is known. 
It includes for example: advertising power in spreading cultural commodities, management by 
dispossession [26,34,49] and abuse of monopoly statuses [4,48]. Corporations exercise political 
process and political influence through lobbying [50]. They also shape public opinion through 
political maneuvers [51]. The intent of profit maximization for serving the interest of 
shareholders reigns supreme [52-54]. That is, similar to most non-state-actors, MNCs are 
technologies used in global governance by private actors [42,55]. In weaker institutions, MNCs 
hardly act justly given the weaker bargaining positions of these communities. Thus, for 
example, human rights abuses and wrong use of corporate political power are common [26,30] 
but unfortunately deviant firms hardly face any real consequences due to legal loopholes, 
besides government complicity and weakened regulatory institutions in host nations [41]. This 
is because the countries where they commit such insidious acts do not have the military power 
to ensure self-defense and retaliation. According to a 2014 CIA report, "International affairs 
will increasingly be determined by large and powerful organizations rather than governments" 
from 2015 and beyond [44]. There is enough evidence of that and such behaviours negatively 
affect good companies within the same ecosystem. In fact, in the broad areas of United Nation's 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) some MNCs seem to be responding with new 
ecologically sound strategies whilst their own governments are pulling out of climate change 
deals. In some developing countries some governments are committed whilst others do business 
as usual.  
)RU WKLVVWXG\ µ:HVWHUQ¶UHIHUV WR86&DQDGD(8DQGE\JHRSROLWLFDOH[WHQVLRQ$XVWUDOLD
These are characterized by historical and cultural ties and most importantly, relatively high 
GDP per capita and advanced forms of industrialization. The latter is the result of being able to 
acquire much needed resources and raw materials from the periphery [33,56,57] in part through 
warfare and imperialism [32,58], which dispossessed others of their resources. This definition 
of what shaped the West is almost always left unarticulated in management research (except by 
the critical scholars) although it has material consequences on the present state of affairs. Most 
importantly, some corporations albeit their international differences, are committed to a 
common solidarity in ensuring the success of their resource seeking agenda²since the Berlin 
Conference in 1885 [42,59]. This in part explains the comparative and competitive advantages 
resulting from the availability of initial resource endowments to finance innovations in the West 
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and why resources are still lacking in the low-income countries. There is a complex set of 
reasons why the developing world is under-resourced financially; µaccumulation by 
dispossession¶ [60-62] is one major explanatory factor. Currently, Western CSR is mostly 
innovation-focused in response to emerging environmental and health challenges (long term), 
especially in the Scandinavia and to a great degree the West as a whole [27]. This is also because 
there is a political will to dedicate available resources to sustainability issues. CSR in Africa by 
contrast is philanthropy [28] and public relations (PR) focused legitimacy seeking (short term) 
[63] with a flourish of boutique projects for cameras. This is not to suggest that there are no 
exceptions. However, we are dealing with what appears to be the rule and not the exceptions. 
This is not to suggest that CSR in Europe is the same as CSR in the United States. There is a 
clear transatlantic gap; and even in Europe the Scandinavians (still with national differences) 
are different from the wider Central Europe and the UK. This of course is explained by the 
national business systems and the varieties of Scandinavian capitalism that are oriented towards 
welfare and sustainability [64]. 
 
Besides asymmetrical geopolitical statuses, the defining difference between the µadvanced¶ 
world(s) and developing world(s) is socio-economic, medico-techno-scientific, and politico-
institutional and military gap on one hand and inequalities in general welfare on the other²the 
historical note of looting and µplanetary vandalism¶ [2] is conveniently forgotten [65] and the 
danger is that it keeps repeating. The exploitation of Africa is a well-known fact as encapsulated 
in the recent comments of Pope Francesco to Reuters:  
We must invest in Africa, but invest in an orderly way and create employment, not go 
there to exploit it. When a country grants independence to an African country it is from 
the ground up ± but the subsoil is not independent. And then people (outside Africa) 
FRPSODLQ DERXW KXQJU\ $IULFDQV FRPLQJ KHUH 7KHUH DUH LQMXVWLFHV WKHUH´ ³LQ RXU
collective unconscious there is something inside us that says Africa must be exploited. 
[66, 65]. 
The subsoil that remains captured, not independent, refers to the soil beneath the surface of the 
earth that contains the gold, diamond, bauxite, crude oil, natural gas, uranium as well as the 
roots of the vegetation on which the populations depend for their survival and livelihood. Thus, 
whoever controls the value chains has the most power to decide about life and death of others 
[56]  
It must be noted that undesirable socio-economic and environmental issues are not unique to 
developing countries [6]. Inequality in the US, UK and Southern Europe is on the rise since the 
2007/2008 financial crisis [67,68]. At the same time there is a rising middle class in the midst 
of poverty all across Africa and other developing and emerging economies [69]. This means 
that one cannot hijack the focus of the study by misconstruing it as some anti-West rhetoric. 
Rather, it is about the search for new mechanisms through which the major actors (governments, 
firms and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) hybrid organizations) can begin to address 
the roots of the problem instead of the symptoms. Global interconnectedness has meant that 
underdevelopment anywhere affects progress everywhere. For example, if an epidemic worsens 
in a far-flung country due to the lack of finance, health infrastructure and proper management 
or governance (e.g. 2014 outbreak of Ebola in some parts of West Africa), anybody in the rich 
US, UK or Switzerland has a rational cause to be worried because we are easily affected directly 
or indirectly by global occurrences, whether they are economic recessions, political turmoil or 
epidemics. These problems also include actions that lead to global warming and climate change 
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and the destruction of biodiversity [2] on the only planet Earth we all call home. A threat to life 
and environment anywhere is a threat to life and environment everywhere. Therefore, seeking 
the optimal solutions to global wellbeing by de-emphasizing the regressive and temporary 
solutions such as charity by economic agents who are playing µ0other Theresa¶ is not only 
objectively logical but ethical for all intents and purposes because of our global 
interconnectedness and common future. It is easy to side with the powerful and play the game, 
but that is nothing short of cowardice and weakness. There is no honor, dignity, humanity or 
courage in taking sides with the powerful, remaining indifferent, refusing to seek the truth no 
matter how inconvenient or ignoring the rest who have become victims of planetary vandalism 
and looting by governments and corporations [2,70]. Therefore, this study demonstrates that 
academia does not seek to ignore those who are adversely affected by CSR tricks [71] but rather 
seeks truth and justice that can potentially bring socio-economic advancement. Herein lays the 
relevance of this paper. 
For the above reasons, we do not restrict our definition of corporate responsibility only to 
business enterprises practicing voluntary CSR that will always prioritize shareholders at the 
expense of moral and distributive expectations. Rather, seen from the grand scheme of things, 
corporate responsibility refers to the proactive duty of major actors in global governance and 
socioeconomic and political organizing (firms, governments, NGOs, international hybrid 
organizations as well as multilateral, national or local entities). These actors make decisions, 
trade-offs and choices based on scarce resources and their operations make them accountable 
because they have socio-ethical, bio-economic, political and environmental consequences that 
have ramifications on health, environment and distributive justice beyond their particular 
context of operations. 
 
Distributive injustice ± government-firm connivance as origins of inequality 
Currently, environmental degradation, air and water pollution have now led to chronic diseases 
while the concession of land to multinationals for mining and palm oil plantations [49] has led 
to the loss of livelihoods in the resource-abundant countries of Africa and South America [25]. 
This has brought about displacement, abuse of human rights and the undermining of human 
dignity [2] or what Harvey [60] calls µaccumulation by dispossession¶, which leads to perilous 
migration in search of economic opportunities. The land grabbing phenomenon, for example, 
can be seen as the result of several µLnter-relating processes of privatization and financialization¶ 
which are central pillars of neo-liberal capitalism [72,73]. This is ³fuelled by µthe management 
DQGPDQLSXODWLRQRIFULVHV¶± and particularly  WKHGLVFXUVLYHHPSKDVHVRQPXOWLSOHµVFDUFLWLHV¶
in policy debates ± [as well as@«µVWDWHUHGLVWULEXWLRQV¶ZKHUHE\WKHVWDWHDOOLHVZLWKFDSLWDOLVW
business interests, offering concessionary terms, tax breaks and subsidies to support 
investment´ (Harvey, cited in [73]). These are the big issues that require attention but the weak 
stakeholders are way below par to contend with both their own governments and corporate 
juggernauts, leading to the acceptance of alms albeit an imperfect substitute.  
Consider further, a small minority of Africans keep getting ultra-worthy whilst the larger 
majority suffers in poverty according to the 2017 Honest Account report written by a coalition 
of several NGOs [74]. There is currently around 165,000 High Net-Worth Individuals who 
reside in Africa along with the poor. These individuals control a combined of $860 billion 
(Africa Wealth Report 2016 [75]). In 2018, there are 23 billionaires in Africa with a combined 
wealth of nearly $76 billion [76]. Their looted money is quietly kept low tax and in secretive 
offshore accounts in the Channel Islands, Switzerland and the UK [75]. According to the 
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conservative estimates by Gabriel Zucman of the London School of Economics, ultra-worthy 
Africans held around $500 billion in tax havens in 2014 [77]. This amounts to 30% of all 
$IULFD¶V ILQDQFLDl wealth. Clemente and co-authors (2017) [78] mean that these elites have 
stolen $15 billion from their state or people in unpaid taxes [77]. Table 1 below shows the 
current state of affairs. 
Table 1. $IULFD¶VWRWDOORVVLQELOOLRQVUHVXOWLQJIURPFRUSRUDWHLUUHVSRQVLELOLW\VRXUFH
Honest Accounts 2017 [74] 
Inflows 
Latest available 






Net private grants 11.8 Debt payments by governments 18.0 
Decrease in international 
reserve holdings 20.7 
Debt payments by private 
sector 9.8 
Loans to governments 32.8 Increase in international 
reserve holdings 0.0 
Loans to private  sector 
(FDI and non-FDI) 20.6 
Multinational company 
profits 32.4 
Net portfolio equity 7.2 Illicit financial outflows 67.6 
Net FDI equity 15.8 Outward remittances 3.8 
Inward remittances 31.2 µ%UDLQGUDLQ¶ 6.0 
Official aid from OECD 19.1 Illegal logging 17.0 
Official aid from non-
OECD countries 0.6 Illegal fishing 1.7 
Debit interest received 1.8 Illegal trade in 
wildlife/plants and poaching 10.0 
Total 161.6 
Climate change adaptation 
costs 10.6 
Climate change mitigation 
costs 26.0 
Total 202.9 
Net annual deficit: $41.3 billion 
 
It is argued that the philanthropy thesis for developing economies is therefore used as a 
hoodwink mechanism to divert the attention from pressing socioǦeconomic and environmental 
issues as well as misuse of corporate political power that leads to mega-corruption, under-
pricing of resources and non-payment of taxes [74,78]. Why should those who have so much 
money and resources be turned into the face of poverty [74]? Globally, our knowledge about 
business and society issues is incomplete but developmental [17,79-81]. Context-wise, our 
knowledge of business and society nexus, particularly in Africa remains only surface-deep, and 
attempts at investigating intractable contemporary issues remain on an elementary level at best 
[82]. That $IULFD¶VHFRQRPLFKLVWRU\during and after colonialism has shaped the present is 
mostly ignored in management literature [58]. This major historico-geographical and political 
7 
 
part needs recognition [83]. However, it seems that either management scholars are happy to 
ignore it or they just do not know. This feeds into the current gaps in CSR literature when it 
comes to Africa, its people, culture, markets and the way the African businesses and 
governments organize themselves for responsible business with MNCs. All this reinforces the 
current narrative made up of ethnocentric, epistemological claims and domesticated criticisms 
that constantly maintain hierarchical structures of truth [84]. By recognizing these critical 
caveats, we can build on, refine, and refute existing knowledge claims based on novel evidence 
and/or convincing logic. We can also speak for those who are left at the margins and cannot 
speak for themselves [70,85,86]. This, in part, is how we advance knowledge and energize the 
debate on CSR, especially given the paucity of comparative studies and the abundance of 
compartmentalized studies that resist change by upholding the status quo of hegemonic views 
[14,87].The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First we explain the research 
approach based on institutional void, followed by the novelty of the study; i.e. why CSR cannot 
be reduced to philanthropy after presenting the historical antecedents of CSR across Africa. 
Discussions then precede the conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
 
Understanding CSR: conceptual development  
 
The nature of CSR actions mutates with context, not the content (Fig. 1). Thus, this explains 
why firms/organizations enact CSR that actually meets contextual needs with long-term 
sustainable innovations that lead to structural socioeconomic changes whilst other firms embark 
on short-term PR legitimating tactics [71]. The strength of institutions visǦàǦvis colossal 
corporate political power dictates this. The moderating factor is whether or not the concerned 
communities lack or have stake and power to define corporate actions in their own backyard as 
is the case in the industrialized world. 
 
Understanding CSR regime from the perspective of time and within institutional context [88] 
comprises a mass of technical and normative elements²the socio-economic and technical 
specifics that embody the national CSR dynamics. This means that business and society issues 
present very complex epistemological, ontological and contextual questions that require 
innovative methods and approaches in studying them. This study draws on the literature on 
institutional voids, their definitions and comparative linkages with CSR practices in 
industrialized West and emerging Africa. Of course this dichotomy is ever more useless given 
the new geographies of wealth distribution [67,69], on one hand increasing affluence across 
Africa [69,89] and on the other increasing poverty in the West [68]. We seek to uncover the 
potential flaws, in-built limits and neglected factors in the conceptualization of CSR in Africa 
in its diversity and contradictions. The objectives of this study are to: 
 
(i) Map out the terrain of existing research on CSR in Africa whilst weighing the 
hierarchies of credibility of existing theories with systematic doubt. 
 
(ii) Compare CSR practices in Africa with CSR practices in the West beyond the 
institutional void hypothesis. This dialectical approach based on CSR literature-
mapping exercise introduces the hypothesis of pluriversal polities and paradigms in 
explaining why CSR cannot be defined by a label but by actual practices that lead 
























Figure 1. Institutional definitions of content and context of CSR. WECS Africa = West, East, 
Central and Southern Africa. 
 
 
Our analysis will hopefully redirect attention towards a more comprehensive and updated 
conceptualization of different (or non-Western) institutions that are not deficient institutions 
per se but are simply different in the way they shape CSR practices. The idea here is not only 
to punch holes into the existing, mostly silo narrative of CSR across 54 countries in Africa but 
also to provide concrete evidence that challenges or corroborates the paradigm of expectation 
(to use the words of Neil deGrasse Tyson) which reinforces and perpetuates a natural tendency 
to take untested assumptions for granted. 
 
 
Contextualizing CSR in Africa 
 
Although written in a measured tone and polished academese, CSR literature on Africa is 
mostly oblivious to the serious contextual and historical questions whilst alluding to the same 
taken-for-grDQWHG GDPDJLQJ YRFDEXODODULHV µKHOS¶ µDLG¶ µSKLODQWKURS\¶ WR WKH µSRRU¶, 
µGLVDGYDQWDJHG¶ µXQGHUGHYHORSHG¶ µOHDVW DGYDQFHG¶ µThird World¶, µperiphery¶
µPDUJLQDOL]HG¶µKDYH-noWV¶. All these words have been in vogue since the the colonial era and 
they are presented with cringeworthy images suggesting that Africa is synonymous to µWKHIRXU
Ds¶: death, disease, destruction and desperation and must be helped. At first glance the need to 
help the µhave-nots¶ seems quite convincing and emotionally appealing. However, a deeper 
analysis immediately announces the shortsighted nature, and the concequences it produces such 
as dependency, complacency and digression from the main problems just like aid programmes 
[90-92]. Wrong assumptions and doom-laden clichés presented as facts and theories [93] 
undermine responsible management practices. However, it is hard to see any serious reaction 
against such an abuse of the academic platform. It is interesting to see the level of naïveté and 
onesidedness with which so many write about Africa vis-à-vis the West [94]. The narrative is 
mostly about how we can help them (the others) rather than how did they come to this, or what 
Institutional 
expectations 
of priority areas shaped 
by exogenous 
pressures, not local 




(What and how) 
CSR ± Context 
based on reason 
& purpose & 
institutional 
congruence 
(Why and where)  
CSR as the firm sees it, 
not as the locals 
desire²subsequent 
behaviors seek to 
invisibilize the potential 
and showcase 
desperation & charity 
                                   WECS Africa         The West         
Socioeconomic (poverty)                High         Low 
Infrastructure
                                                     
Developing             Developed 
Environmental pollution                 High               Low 
Stakeholder profile                Weak                     Strong 
Institutional profile                 Weak                     Strong 
Geopolitical status                   Weak                  Hegemonic 
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they are doing to change the situation. Here, the emerging literature then suggests an African 
economic renaissance [95], increasing intra-African FDI ± ³$IULFD ULVLQJ RXW RI LWVHOI 7KH
growth of intra-$IULFDQ )',´ [96,97], and the changing dynamics in African international 
business across Africa [98]. 
 
First, WECS (West, East, Central and Southern) Africa or what others call Sub-Saharan Africa 
is treated as a monolithic region, and North Africa as another [99]. This is an oversimplification 
and intellectually misleading. See the definition of WECS Africa by Ahen [6] which clarifies 
the heterogeneous nature of countries and regions across Africa. Ghana is not Somalia, South 
Africa is not Chad. There are regional characteristics and within the nations there are different 
regions based on whether they are Francophone, Anglophone, Lusophone, Arab speaking or a 
mixture. None of these even does justice to the arbitrary partitioning of Africa and the displaced 
ethnic groups scattered in different countries who share the same cultural experiences and 
therefore may have similar institutional expectations. Also, the economies and the types of 
market capitalisms pursued differ enormously [100]. A cursory look at the CNN Market Place 
Africa demonstrates that CEOs of companies confess their ignorance prior to operating 
anywhere in Africa. They underscore cultural, economic and governance diversity and 
institutional heterogeneity, not a monolithic continent. The following self-explanatory quote 
sums up what we are actually dealing with.  
 
What we now increasingly do is we think much more in terms of sub-clusters, where you 
KDYHHDVW$IULFDZKHUH\RXKDYHZHVW$IULFDZKHUH\RXKDYHVRXWKHUQ$IULFD« Frank 
Braeken, the executive vice president of Unilever in Africa, said that for a long time 
multinationals have thought of the vast continent as a "monolithic" market, failing to 
address its diversity. "The African consumer has been underestimated, underserved and 
underserviced," said Braeken. "What I mean is we have looked at it a little bit 
generically, like 'the Africans,' a little bit patronizing generically. Now we start to take 
WKH$IULFDQFRQVXPHUVHULRXVO\«,
PDOPRVWVRPHZKDWDVKDPHGWRDGPLWWKDWZHDUH
still very much in learning mode about what the differences are within 
$IULFD«5DWKHU WKDQ MXVW D FRQWLQHQW $IULFD PXVW EH YLHZHG DV  VHSDUDWH DQG
distinct countries with a wide array of political, economic, geographical, cultural and 
social features," said Nielsen's µThe Diverse People of Africa¶ UHSRUW«WKHUH LV QR
µVLQJOH$IULFDQFRQVXPHU¶,QVWHDG>WKHUHDUH@VHYHQW\SHVRIFRQVXPHUV>WKDW@FDQEH
grouped in three tiers based on their monthly income and average spending. [101] 
 
In the same vein, smaller African countries such as the Gambia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, 
Namibia, have limited bargaining power vis-à-vis the colossal MNCs. For this reason, we 
cannot expect that their bargaining power can help shape what MNCs make of CSR. It is here 
that CSR is required when there is the need for accountability where strong institutional 
structures are lacking. The diverse contexts of Africa make any attempt at generalization false 
and misleading. Each of the 17 emerging countries in Africa is unique [69]. Nevertheless, there 
is an emerging consensus about their common patterns of development that are influenced by 
both endogenous and exogenous factors. The changing patterns of consumption, new mobility 
frontiers (rural-urban influx) leading to the rise of megacities and the exponential increase in 
the middle class alongside the left-behind in the rise of Africa portrays a novel scenario worth 
investigating. Most importaQWO\$IULFD¶VLQWHJUDWLRQLQWRthe global market is more than in any 
other period in recent history [102]. Therefore, as with any in other country, proper governance, 
taxes, rents from natural resource endowments for infrastructure and investments in innovations 





Institutional void and differences in CSR 
 
The dominant hypothesis or the text book script is that where the institutions do not bear the 
inherent characteristics of Western (Euro-American) systems (efficient banking systems with 
legal and enforcement mechanisms), then we put zero in the equation. Or, where governance 
structures are weak, corporations must step in [103] even though they were not created for 
providing public utilities under any constitutional order. Economic agents mostly respond to 
owners and not citizens. A complicated way of labeling a weak governance system is 
µLQVWLWXWLRQDOYRLG¶[23,37,104]. This is a tragedy, but what does it mean for the manager who 
must practice authentic CSR or the people of the contexts we theorize about? This is a useful 
analysis because the concept involves µinstitutions¶ and µvoid¶ or µemptiness¶ in the same line. 
This is then constantly tied to a vital need to fix, regulate and fill. However, if we introduce the 
shifting contours of African contexts (geopolitical and economic blocks, the different levels of 
political and economic emancipation and different forms of capitalism, such as crony, informal 
or liberal), it immediately sweeps away the worn-out clichés and the colonial hangovers that 
establish the burden to philanthropize development rather than innovatively engaging with 
countries to solve the root questions based on the contextual demands [105,106]. Are these 
complete and satisfactory perspectives grounded in serious empirical evidence, just reductive 
explanations of a complex substantive domain or are there some missing details in the bigger 
picture? There are arguments that challenge the above suppositions. Before that a survey of the 
literature is presented on institutions and their links with CSR. 
 
 
Survey of literature on institutional void 
 
Analyses of institutions as foundations for understanding relative differences in CSR practices 
in different contexts abounds. See for example: Aguilera and Jackson [107]; Hoskisson, et al. 
[108]; Husted and Allen [109]; Jamali [5]; Namada and Bagirea [40]; Zhao, et al. [110]. The 
quest for a deeper comparative understanding of institutions and CSR practices for the 
engineering of innovative solutions to sustainability questions is now imperative. Institutional 
theory has been adopted by international business and management scholars to address country-
specific or important regional issues [111-114]. Nevertheless, the CSR literature presents an 
interesting mixture; a cacophony of confused collection of analyses, as well as overstated 
speculations alongside a clearly formulated and serious representation of theory about the 
African context. The studies range from empirical or conceptual analyses to general reviews 
and commentaries. These come from an assortment of highly regarded and well-rounded 
academics all the way to wannabes who pick any interesting theoretical model to explain Africa, 
albeit with fundamentally flawed premises. This brings up the Alvessonian question; do they 
have something to say [115]? 
 
The formal elegance of the institutional theory is endlessly fascinating. Its analytical 
connections with corporate responsibility issues are intricately interwoven. It reveals the 
anatomy of organizations in a nuanced manner and in profound ways. It also traces social 
structures, as well as socio-cultural, normative and regulatory systems that affect and are 
affected by organizations [116]. It provides an interesting framework with which to analyze 
how organizations operating in different contexts are shaped by not only their ecology of 
organizations [117] but also unseen and untouchable systems or the rules that shape human 
actions and interactions [118]. By its very nature, the institutional theory is highly complex and 
yet is able to simplify business-society issues in an interdisciplinary manner. This explains its 
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conceptual usefulness in different subject areas. The preference for institutional theory stems 
from the fact that its explanatory depth conducts the scholar to an immediate awareness of how 
little we know about the complexity of the social world and the interactions between resources 
and actors. Following Scott (2014) [116], we offer reasons why institutional theory merits 
spHFLDO DWWHQWLRQ HVSHFLDOO\ LQ WKH VWXG\ RI &65 ,QVWLWXWLRQDO WKHRU\ LV D µILW-for-SXUSRVH¶
framework for studying and posing provocative questions about the way organizations behave 
and work, inside and in relation to their environment. This framework helps to unravel the 
reasons why moral obligations are either pursued or ignored by organizations, considering the 
role of individual actors in enacting strategies. Further, according to Scott (2014) [116], this 
institutional framework also helps to connect the micro- and the macro-levels of social 
structures whilst linking the past and the contemporary, and acting as a tool for understanding 
the probable future [119]. Most importantly for our purpose, institutional theory connects 
multiple fields in the socio-economic sciences, allowing for a rich interdisciplinary study and 
understanding of VRFLDOSKHQRPHQDZKHUHWKHPRGHUQFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VRSHUDWLRQs in marginalized 
communities are hugely implicated [47,55,86]. For Hofstede, et al. [120] ³institutions are the 
crystallization of culture, and culture is the substratum of institutional arrangements´+HQFH
any attempt to claim causality link between the two is a useless endeavor [121]. 
Notwithstanding all the above conceptualizations, institutions around the emerging and 




Novelty and purpose  
 
The central argument presented here is that big international business and geopolitics go hand 
in hand [42,44,122]. In weaker institutions, MNCs have powerful influences on regulations 
[123] and they profoundly shape the nature of institutions mostly to their advantage  [41] and 
at the expense of the larger society [34,47,86]. Former colonial masters of Africa enlisted non-
VWDWHDFWRUVWRFRQWLQXHWKHµSUHQGHHVFDSSD¶WDNHDQGUXQDZD\XVLQJ$IULFDµ3HULSKHU\¶as 
the source for resources and the µCHQWUH¶IRU manufacturing and refinement [32]. This study 
introduces the hypothesis of pluriversal polities and paradigms in explaining the irregularities 
and order of institutional settings. Thus, within the developing economies of Africa, there are 
polities and systems that are outside the parameters of the existing ontologies, cultural frame of 
thought and the expectations of Western Management researchers. Further, there are polities 
and systems across Africa that operate in parallel with Western models. It is postulated that 
wherever human societies exist, there are forms of organizing. These organizations are both 
international and local in nature [42]. They are also embedded in socio-economic, political and 
cultural/religious institutions/polity [104,124] that shape and are shaped by responsible or 
irresponsible organizational practices in both evolutionary and revolutionary ways. Nothing 
comes out of nothing, ex nihilis nihilis fit. It is further postulated that, while market institutions 
may be in constant change, socio-political institutions and informal systems may be very 
resilient to technological and other exogenous shocks.  
Scholars attribute institutional void to both market and government failures. More specifically 
the lack of infrastructure, strong legal framework, enforcement mechanisms or economic 
progress have led to poverty, unemployment, high disease burden and general economic 
underdevelopment [and more recently 19,20,21,125]. This thesis is also supported in part by 
Kuada and Hinson [22] whose study concludes that local and international firms appear to see 
CSR differently. Local firms do discretionary acts because society expects that those who have 
more should give more. In other words, in a mostly Christian population, the idea of µto whom 
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much is given much is required¶RUDFWVRIFKDULW\DQGVKDULQJDUHFOHDUO\ERWKDQ$IULFDQas 
well as Judeo-Christian tradition. Jamali [5] also offers similar examples from the Middle East 
and Northern Africa or Muslim countries²otherwise called Zakat (the Islamic obligation to 
give alms). For example, foreign firms in Ghana, according to Kuada and Hinson (2012) [22], 
engage in CSR because of legal requirements. However, truly responsible firms cannot neglect 
normative obligations. None of that is true CSR per se. By contrast, in Germany and 
6FDQGLQDYLDIRUH[DPSOHWKHZRUNHUV¶XQLRQV¶DELOLW\WRSUHVVKRPHWKHLUGHPDQGVLVIDFLOLWDWHG
by strong legislation to ensure the wellbeing of employees. In this sense only what the firm does 
beyond the legal requirements to provide welfare for all concerned is considered corporate 
responsibility²a far cry from giving alms. Across Africa, however, the weak stakeholder 
constellations have meant that what is considered legally binding normal behavior in the West 
is labeled CSR. 
 
³In Africa, CSR activities consist mostly of those activities that add to infrastructure or the 
economic development of the community through job creation, taxation´ [126]. However, 
corporate tax payment is deemed a normal behavior required by law; it is not a special act. 
Companies hire because they require labor to make things work and they build roads where 
they will need them to transport mostly raw materials with ease. In 2000, a survey conducted 
by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development [127] demonstrates how CSR in 
the neo-liberal era is an attempt to fill the institutional and governance voids in developing 
economies. For example, when Ghanaians were asked how they think CSR should be defined, 
WKH\VWUHVVHGµEXLOGLQJORFDOFDSDFLW\¶DQGµILOOLQJLQZKHQJRYHUQPHQWIDOOVVKRUW¶ However, 
the study does not take into consideration the created quest for help from outsiders as a symptom 
of a dependency syndrome. The emergence of Public Private Partnerships and government±
NGO partnerships as a way of sharing responsibility is what Whelan, et al. [128] refer to as 
RUJDQL]DWLRQVDFWLQJLQµFLYLFUHSXEOLFDQLVP¶VWDWXV7KLVKDVEHHQWKHFDVHHYHQVLQFHWKHHDUO\
1970s with technical assistance, human investments and other forms of aid but this has not 
bridged the gap between the so-called developed and developing economies [65,129]. They 
have been useful for alleviating temporary pains, but as boutique actions they are not in any 




The hypothesis of pluriversal polities and paradigms 
 
How do we decrypt the idea of weak institutions as simply referring to weaker populations in 
essence? Culture, cognitive frames, regulation, mores and associated activities and resources 
would mean nothing without a nation or people. In other words, weak institutions mean weak 
people who must be helped and or taken advantage of. In evolutionary terms the weak must 
succumb to the strong in the scramble for survival of the fittest in a Darwinian sense. All human 
societies have evolved over the millennia with ideas, philosophies, norms or lifestyles, 
traditions, arts, ways of valuing and attaching worth to products and services, as well as written 
and unwritten rules governing exchange [124]. Institutions exist in all humans societies. There 
is no vacuum. They only differ from one context to another. In fact, Jared Diamond [130] in 
The world until yesterday suggests that there is a lot to learn from traditional societies to 
complement emergent social practices. Any ordinary observer from another planet could 
OHJLWLPDWHO\TXHVWLRQWKHUHDVRQIRUWKLVVHPDQWLFGLVWRUWLRQµLQVWLWXWLRQDOYRLG¶7KHWDNHQ-for-
granted assumption, which is mainly Western-centric, is that if the formal institutional 
structures are not fashioned in a way that allows MNCs (especially those in the extractive 




institutional structures are based on non-Western models. Moreover, as the more powerful 
actors, MNCs influence such contexts by removing or neglecting existing norms and 
reinstituting new norms and practices as long as they serve to manipulate the system and 
µVWUXFWXUHV RI DFFXPXODWLRQ¶. Nevertheless, this is not done with the contextual logics and 
structures in mind but with framework that in the end disadvantages the already marginalized. 
These Western views are not improper; they are simply different to the particular African 
context. This causes disruption that leads to increasing friction²to which we shall return. 
 
Institutions have a significant impact on political economy which refers to the relationship 
between economic conditions and the political choices that the citizens of a state have to make 
[61,62]. Contemporary scholars of institutions point to the analysis of voids in institutions (see 
definitions in Table 2 below). 
 
Table 2. Definitions of institutions and their characterizations 
 




On the market and macroeconomic level, the 
voids represent the absence of intermediaries 
such as market research consultancies, 




operations but they also 
represent untapped 




Institutional voids are ³commonly defined as 
gaps between rules and their purpose and the 
effectiveness of their implementation´. They 
create spaces for entrepreneurial activity, but, 
on the flip side, they also allow for the 
corporate irresponsibility as well as over-







Voids appear when ³economic growth is 
faster than the development of social and 
institutional structures´. Rodrigues (2013b) 
presents two forms of institutional voids: 
structural and contingent. The structural 
institutional voids refer to how rules are 
formally presented in the books but the 
system lacks enforcement capacity, while 
contingent institutional voids are the 
combination of socio-economic and political 
factors affecting a particular market or 
economy. 
Institutional voids 
consist of both 
structural and 
contingent elements 
Hajer (2003, p. 
175) [104] 
³µ,QVWLWXWLRQDOYRLG¶>H[LVWV@ZKHre there are 
no generally accepted rules and norms 
according to which politics is to be 
conducted and policy measures are to be 
agreed upon´. The author argues whether 
there can be policies and strategies without a 
polity. 
Fundamental 
deficiencies existing in 





Dacin et al. 
(2011); Zahra et 
al. (2009) 
[134,135] 
Institutional void also denotes less active 
governments. 
The filling of the void 
requires social 
entrepreneurship  
Kalvet et al. 
(2013) [136] 
Institutional voids trigger the emergence of 
global firms and innovation networks. 
Firms internationalize 
their production due to 









Institutional voids present an interesting case 
by provide major opportunities for 
entrepreneurship in Bangladesh. But these 
so-called voids are also trapped potentials 
which represent an opportunity for social 
change and not to be seen only as problems 
or a reason for exploitation. 
 
A form of turbulence 
comprising both 
business opportunities 
and a force for social 
change 
Dacin et al. 
(2011) [134] 
Institutional void also denotes the massive 





None of the above suggests that voids were created by certain historical actions. This is because 
voids do not occur organically but by human actions that require to be reversed and serve as a 
platform for fundamental changes. 
 
 
Why is philanthropy a major face of corporate responsibility in Africa?  
 
That CSR in Africa must mostly be represented as, or has the image of, charity is a false 
equivalence that tricks students, stakeholders and other practitioners into misdiagnosing the real 
ethical and environmental responsibilities and for offering the real solutions. What we see is an 
argumentum ad populum which is obviously the results of academic hegemony [14] that passes 
a unidimensional view of superior practices to future managers. This is not to suggest that 
Western epistemological positions are unwanted or flawed. They simply do not always produce 
contextual frames that are meaningful when they ignore local exigencies. We are not suggesting 
that philanthropy per se is a bad idea, quite the opposite; just that it has its place. It is not a 
substitute to actual responsibility that solves structural socioeconomic and environmental 
problems with new innovations due to its intermittent nature. This means governments must 
commit massive resources to modernize formal structures to reduce the innovation gap. The 
question is, who controls those resources [56]? There is the need to meaningfully redefine 
imposed practices and discourses of CSR that tend to invalidate local ideas and realities. 
Counterfactual examples of corporate charity abound. However, we are looking at the bigger 
picture here. Philanthropy per se is not an unwelcome cause. But within the discourse at hand, 
it is a plaster to a situation that requires surgery. Philanthropy is a good deed but not the best 
solution to structural problems. In fact, in some cases the way it is practiced makes it a 
counterproductive act in several ways: From a purely marketing perspective, it creates an image 
deficit for African innovations, products and services and even undermines the dignity of 
African peoples as the face of poverty in the world. How much is a good image worth? 
Advertisers and marketers know that it is in billions and beyond because of trust, respect and 
status. Additionally, such negative image deters investors and tourists because of manufactured 
risks and reinforced negative image and perceptions [139,140]. Meanwhile philanthropy 
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campaigns steal the spotlight from local Africans (private and corporate) who are doing their 
best while  overshadowing the fact that remittances by fellows in the diaspora are more than 
the total amount of aid in any given year [141]. For example, the rap artist Akon co-founded 
the Konfidence Foundation (konfidence.org), a health and education charity for underprivileged 
children in West Africa and the United States. He also co-founded the Akon Lighting Africa 
project in 2014, which Akon's site says has brought solar power to 18 African countries so far 
(akonlightingafrica.com). And there are thousands of examples more, both from MNCs (e.g. 
Coca-Cola partnering with World vision [142]; BASF¶V VXVWDLQDEOH VWUDWHJ\ LQ GHYHORSLQJ
economies [143]; German companies in South Africa [144]) and individuals. However, in most 
cases charity shows the negative images and statistics that tend to suggest that only poverty 
abounds [26] even though there is a rising middle class in their millions [145]. It relieves the 
uncaring wealthy Africans of the responsibility to invest in Africa instead of depositing millions 
in foreign accounts. In fact, on the aid front, the Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta (2015) [146] 
recently tweeted that: 
 
The future of our continent cannot be left with the good graces of outside interests. 
Dependency on giving that only appears to be charitable must end. Foreign aid which 
so often carries terms and a condition that precludes progress is not an acceptable 
basis for prosperity and freedom. It is time to give it up. 
 
More recently, the government of President Nana Akufo-Addo of Ghana has set up a committee 
to draw up a charter which will make µGhana beyond aid¶ QRW MXVW D PDQWUD EXW a way to 
effectively collect taxes DQG PDNH UHVSRQVLEOH XVH RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V UHVRXUFHV LQVWHDG RI
depending on the good graces of others. 
 
All the above is because it is generally accepted across Africa that philanthropy-based CSR by 
some MNCs in marginalized communities is a colonizing concept [58,147], disguised as 
OLEHUDWLRQ WR µLQYLVLELOL]H¶ PDssive socio-ecological harms [25,26] while highlighting minor 
shows of benevolence. More specifically, philanthropy is a universal way of demonstrating 
human compassion. It is very normal for individuals or organizations to support those in 
distress, to promote something of social interest with resources or to give donations and relief 
to those in need due to a natural disaster or a temporary unfavorable socio-economic condition. 
However, it must be recognized that none of these is meant to be permanent. Hence, to be 
labeled an eternal recipient of help/aid puts a host nation or community in a position (negative 
branding) that does not allow it to live up to its full potential [90]. Scholarships/grants, or 
community empowerment programs constitute  investments by firms, governments and NGOs 
to foster education or research that will benefit everyone in the long run, including firms [148]. 
They are commendable investments, not costs. Clearly, firms exist to economize on transaction 
costs. In the light of efficiency thesis, then, giving corporate cash or kind is not an efficiency 
driver²unless it is an offensive or defensive act for earning legitimacy [149]. It must serve 
some strategic purpose. CSR is a socio-economic, political and environmental obligation that 
demands accountability from organizational actions and use of scarce resources. All that must 
have an ethical foundation [4].  
 
Is it possible then that communities in weaker institutions accept philanthropy as a substitute 
for genuine sustainability-oriented CSR because they lack any bargaining power or choice and 
have no stake that empowers them to press home their demands [150]. Are these arguments 
convincing or are there layers of understanding yet to be explored? The points below are not to 
be interpreted as anti-philanthropy but as manipulation based on a system that tricks 
stakeholders into believing in the benevolence of the powerful who give with one hand and take 
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more with the other. This much is held as a secret from the good rich people who give willingly 
in the hope of changing otherV¶ lives, but for some on the other side this is an industry. 
  
First, given the institutional heterogeneities, compressed forms of development [42] and 
national business systems across Africa, the emphasis on charity as a form of CSR, not as an 
aberration but a norm, in different African nations may be hiding something about the 
environmental degradation, land grabbing and dispossession [49,69,73,151]. Therefore, leaving 
such false assumptions by academics and practitioners unchallenged may constitute an 
irresponsible legitimization of corporate malpractices and endorsement of misleading 
vocabularies of motive that deviate wholly from the optimal societal expectations of sincere 
CSR [10,48]. At the same time there is a growing number of boutique projects which are seen 
as simply legitimating tactics [71]. This is because in most cases CSR is either defensive or 
offensive strategy [152], notwithstanding the amount of evidence that putting socio-economic 
and environmental value creation first yields better results than putting stockholder value 
creation first [106,153] 
 
Second, this hypothesis assumes WKDW 01&V¶ &65 SUDFWLFHV in host countries must be 
exceptionally different because of perceived poverty despite resource abundance. In home 
countries the practice involves innovation-focused strategy (long term) [27], whilst in host 
countries it is about philanthropy (short-term relief). Third, some authors argue that although 
philanthropy is commendable, like aid, it is unsustainable and creates dependence and 
complacency [90] and has little to do with effective CSR in action to bring about structural-
institutional change. Fourth, philanthropy-based CSR clouds the intractable problems resulting 
from corporate externalities, whilst offering simplistic and ad-hoc solutions through one-way 
transfer instead of stakeholder engagement [138,154]. At first glance, philanthropy in the public 
eye is the optimal response to filling the institutional voids and gaining legitimacy. However, 
it is neither sufficient nor necessary for the sustainability imperative in the long term. 
 
It follows in the fifth point that, philanthropy by corporations is in vogue in weaker institutions, 
but less so in the West. Nevertheless, philanthropy hardly produces the needed structural change 
due to its unsustainable and ad-hoc nature. Economies do not develop through hand-outs 
[90,91,155]; they develop through responsible innovations where both private and public 
sectors take full responsibility for their day-to-day actions beyond the legal requirements to 
improve welfare and bring about change. Ethical behavior then represents obedience beyond 
legal requirements or the enforceable with the value chains of material extraction and human 
resource.  
 
In addition, critics have argued that in weaker institutions, philanthropy-focused CSR creates 
dependency, forces governments to abdicate responsibility to corporations [4,34,156] and 
disempowers stakeholders due to the lack of quid pro quo. Thus, unsustainable aid and 
philanthropy outside situations of emergency are disempowering mechanisms for achieving 
economic development. The neglected voices at the margins only sporadically receive cash and 
kind in the form of charity. However, as Moseley [157] SXWV LW ³,W¶V LQVXOWLQJ >PRUDOO\
degrading] to be classified as an object of charity. Worse yet, the charity model may 
GLVHPSRZHUORFDOSHRSOHE\FRQYLQFLQJWKHPWKDWWKH\DUHVRPHKRZLQIHULRU´In fact, ethicists 
and economists share this view [6,90]. More disturbingly, Chiminazzo [158] argues that within 
the markets and economics of the era of globalization, philanthropy gives nothing new but only 
translates into momentary satisfaction. It requires back a condition of permanent gratitude, if 
not the inferiority of its receivers. A famous quote by the civil rights pioneer Dr. Martin Luther 
King sums this argument up perfectly ³philanthropy is commendable´. However, it ³must not 
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cause the philanthropist to overlook the circumstances of economic injustice which make 
philanthropy necessary´ [in the first place]. 
 
Furthermore, this way of pitying is not an accidental practice. It is a well-designed approach of 
negatively branding WKHµ2WKHUV¶SXWWLQJWKHPLQWKHLUSODFHWKDWPDNHVDOOSURGXFWVZLWKWKH
country of origin from Africa easily considered inferior [159,160] and purchased by kind people 
just to help those who cannot help themselves. However, such products are not purchased for 
their quality or prestige. This enormously reduces the competitiveness of African products. 
Such systems as they are perpetuated go to the point that people of the African continent are 
treated as inferior people in international trade negotiations [122]. They are always 
shortchanged and their interests matter less most of the time [161,162]. 
 
More so, the fundamental reason why CSR in Africa cannot and must not be based on a 
reductionist thinking that simplifies everything into philanthropy is our common pool resources 
[163]. Socio-economic, political, or environmental irresponsibility under the watchful eyes of 
complicit or co-conspiring governments anywhere affects everyone everywhere because of the 
global interconnectedness and interdependence. Hence, global warming as well as 
environmental, air and water pollution caused by big firms are not to be treated as distant issues 
which require philanthropy to solve. They require actual action to prevent them; rather, a 
concerted effort in which the bearers of major responsibility are identified and made 
accountable for taking so much and willing to give so little or nothing back [74]. Further, one 
cannot reduce the needed CSR discourse to a mere philanthropic gesture, especially in times 
like these where global uncertainties abound. This is because poverty and economic under-
development are symptoms of much broader and deeper geopolitical, international and political 
economy factors. Together, these factors have a long history of abuses and structural forms of 
inequality [164]. In synthesis, MNCs have socio-political, environmental, economic and ethical 
responsibility everywhere, every time in all day-to-day activities. Philanthropy is not the main 
function of a business entity, philanthropy is a discretionary activity. Therefore, the fact that 
ILUPV¶GRQDWLRQVDUHODEHOHGDV&65GRHVQRWQHFHVVDU\PHDQWKDWWKH\LQGHHGFRQVWLWXWH&65
unless such an action is a proactive integration of CR and socially useful (ethically acceptable) 
innovations into corporate strategy, i.e. strategic CR [154] that intentionally avoids harm. To 
WKLVHQGLWLVDUJXHGWKDWGRLQJµIUHHJLYHDZD\V¶LVQRW&65RQO\EHFDXVHILUPVKDYHFKRVHQWR
label it with such a nomenclature to describe something that is nothing more than a legitimating 
tactic [165]. On the other hand, sustainability issues arise where MNCs operate with impunity 
and with unrivaled corporate political power [47,48,156]; slave labour [166]; and the pursuit of 
vices through the use of corporate political power [167] and total institutions [168]. A total 
institution has been defined as an RUJDQL]DWLRQWKDWKDVPRUHRUOHVVPRQRSRO\RILWVPHPEHUV¶
everyday life [169,see also 170]. Taking responsibility for an oil spill or environmental 
degradation is one thing and giving gifts to community schools is another. Philanthropic actions 
have moved from being a mere PR tactic to removing governance and regulatory power from 
the collective to the individual [71,156]. Such a situation is dangerous because it fails to address 
the fundamental problems that undermine democracy [2,43] in the host country. The gravity of 
this, however, depends on the degree of weakness RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VLQVWLWXWLRQV. 
 
More disturbingly, paltry attempts by big corporations to appease local communities after 
environmental degradation have now become a staple in the play book of how to calm down 
angry protests by environmentalists. These include media campaigns and philanthropic gestures 
for face saving, which are temporary solutions to emerging health and environmental questions. 
These oversimplified solutions lead us to the next important point. If CR is viewed as the sum 
total of the whole investment and the resulting products, then philanthropy is a big trick that 
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has deceptively worked for a long time because it ignores all the following: (i) the physiological 
condition of the natural environment where resources are taken; (ii) the conditions of the human 
resources employed in transforming raw materials (manufacturing process using child labor or 
dangerous working conditions), the textile industry is an example; (iii) the environmental 
footprint of extractivism, transportation and distribution; (iv) the safety of products and their 
ethical use; and (v) the responsible final disposal of the consumed products back into the 
environment. For example, African countries have for long served as the dumping ground for 
electronic and other forms of waste [171]. This flaw in making philanthropy a corporate 
resource in Africa removes any idea of a sustainable design and green technologies as an 
imperative of sustainable CR actions. Philanthropy in its nature obscures the negative elements 
of globalization, neo-liberal capitalism and authoritarian systems which manifest themselves in 
global agenda setting, decision making and regulations [172]. These include land grabbing and 
other neo-extractive approaches of development [25]. Charity or philanthropy does not do away 
with trade distortion policies such as protectionism disguised as hygiene protection as well as 
dumping that kills local industries [173]. Philanthropy then obscures key emerging issues such 
as robotization and automation of production resulting in fewer jobs for people. The next point 
that makes our case here is donor fatigue especially in the current economic climate. In fact, 
emerging economic problems reveal how unsustainable dependency is. 
 
More to the point, the images of the poor around the world tend to suggest that no-one from 
their communities is helping; they are stuck as their portion in life and that is the way it is. 
Nothing could be farther from the truth. Across the developing world, there are several local 
NGOs who do their best to bring change (sometimes in collaboration with international NGOs) 
without jeopardising the image of the people and they deserve more credit than they are 
receiving. We agree that there are countries or communities that need help sometimes. 
However, when that becomes permanent, then we are rather treating them as mentally 
handicapped who cannot help themselves instead of asking how the problem came about in the 
first place. This will be making the case for Lynn and Vanhanen [174] who argue that the 
mentally weak, or more precisely, those with biological predisposition to have low IQ must be 
helped as a moral duty. 7KHUHIRUHLWLVWKHZKLWHPDQ¶VEXUGHQWRFORWKHDQGIHHG$IULFDDIWHU
civilizing it [91]. The relevant question is, is how do Africans want to see themselves?  
 
The final and most prominent case against philanthropy as a substitute for responsible 
behaviour is that philanthropy sounds eerily atrocious and manipulative in the ears of every 
conscious African and for a good reason²there is no free lunch and they know. The question 
that remains is that this free lunch is in exchange for how much of what? History offers some 
noteworthy answers. Colonialists who µRZQHG¶ WKH &RQJR DQG LWV SHRSOH DQG UHVRXUFHV 
massacred millions of Africans but this horrible genocide was presented to the good people of 
(XURSHDVDµSKLODQWKURSLF¶DQGµVFLHQWLILF¶RSHUDWLRQE\DKXPDQLWDULDQDQGXQGHUWKHJXLVHRI
the International African Society [175]. The enslaved labour force helped extract resources 
(rubber) controlled by a private army that mutilated hands, tortured and killed millions [175]. 
Even the author Mark Twain and the Archbishop of Canterbury participated in human rights 
activism along with many young European and Americans who risked their lives to expose this 
tragedy. What is interesting is that survivors of other atrocities received massive sums of money 
as reparations but not Africans. Today, under-pricing of resources, non-payment of taxes, mega-
corruption through shell companies and corporate land grabbing [78,176] as well as 
management by dispossession are leaving millions displaced and in poverty [74,86]. 
  
The current PR-style philanthropy as a solution to deep-seated structural problems distracts 
from the root question as to how we got here in the first place. Such a practice also distorts the 
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noble image of humanitarian actors because it makes it difficult to distinguish between those 
with genuine motives and those who are using it as a diversionary non-market strategy to hide 
exploitation. Furthermore, it is a practice that SKLODQWKURSLVWV¶ imagine the beneficiaries as 
passive actors who eternally need help.  
 
On the NGO side, Fred Branson [177] in his TEDx talk argues that using pity to raise funds as 
the key currency in exchange for the dignity of others is not only demeaning but it is unjust:  
 
While organisations may gain in funds, poor communities will lose in dignity, 
empowerment and voice. These communities care about their appearance and 
how they are portrayed. Further, pity is not only unfair to the people who are 
being portrayed in a campaign but it actually distorts our perception of life in 
developing countries.  
 
Such relationships expose an implicit hierarchy within them. While much of the money that is 
raised is unaccounted for, such portrayals lead us to ignore the potential in such people and 
communities. Acting in pity leads us to ³turn humans into passive victims deserving of our pity 
[but not respect]. We dehumanize them. We promote the idea that communitieVGRQ¶WKDYH the 
capacity to solve their own problems and that it¶s we in the West who must single-handedly 
device the solutions´ (ibid.). A good example is the numerous NGOs operating in Northern 




Additionally, there is more on the accountability side of the issue. In fact, the first group that 
countries want to ban are NGOs when there is a conflict because it has also become the very 
group in which it is easy to infiltrate under the cloak of philanthropism. Religious groups give 
cash for socially useful agendas and think they have given to the Lord in good faith and trust of 
the NGO operators. Yet, they mostly demand no accountability. Most of the time, it is simply 
a matter of massaging their own ego by paying the price of appearing good in their own eyes. 
One could imagine what kind of a world it would be if a small percentage of givers would 
randomly question NGOs about how their money is spent [178]. Some NGOs are among the 
most opaque organizations and since there are too many NGOs, they employ a guerrilla 
marketing style: thus the more gory the images are, the higher the pity and therefore the good 
people of the West will respond and the cash flows. The problem at the heart of this is that 
philanthropism is an ever-flourishing industry and part and parcel of the global governance 
structure where the periphery will have to depend on others for survival. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
This study answers the question; how do institutional voids account for the varieties of CSR 
practices across Africa that differ from the Western CSR practices? Moreover, the study 
investigated the follow-up problem; is it possible then, that communities in weaker institutions 
accept philanthropy as a substitute for genuine sustainability-oriented CSR because they lack 
any bargaining power or choice to press home their demands? 
 
Corporate responsibility can be truly conceptualized as investments, analyzed in all their 
ethical, socioǦeconomic, political environmental and the sustainability components, to create 
the maximum social value in a world of scarce resources by all the major actors. Despite this 
general understanding, CSR in Africa has philanthropy as its centerǦpiece. The argument that 
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CSR has no common definition is partly necessary and partly unnecessary. It is necessary 
because it allows for a single theoretical framework with which to work. It will create a more 
generalized understanding. On the other hand, it is unnecessary because it is a dynamic concept 
constrained and enabled by institutions and contextual circumstances. A fixed meaning is 
therefore unhelpful because it will require the standardization of organizational actions 
everywhere but such a situation will not foster innovative differentiation which serves local 
needs.  
 
Contributions to the Literature 
The novelty of this study is that it emphasizes the existence of local polities and paradigms to 
explain that there is no such a thing as institutional void per se but an institutional difference 
outside the paradigm of expectation (well-functioning market and intermediary systems and 
enforcement mechanisms as originally intended [11]). This means that the existing paradigm 
of fixing so-called voids with philanthropy must be interrogated, given its regressive nature and 
diversionary approach to the core issues. Therefore, policies and strategies must adapt to the 
evolutionary dynamics of the context in the quest to answer the questions of famine, disease 
and poverty which firms or governments may have contributed to create in the first place. The 
implications of the results are vast and they are generalizable to all weaker institutional settings. 
We argue that weak institutions create the necessary political and economic climate that 
perpetuates a pattern of abuses and ethical violations. Thus, strong institutions help host nations 
to press home their demands and not get short-changed with philanthropy. The uniqueness of 
this study is that it revitalizes the debate on CSR through a dialectic approach that compares 
one well-studied setting (industrialized nations) with another less explored context (Africa).  
 
The answer to the second question is that weaker institutions clearly lack the bargaining power 
to press home what is naturally theirs. They therefore accept philanthropy in place of higher 
expectations like investments in cutting edge innovations that can contribute to structural 
changes as in the West. The root of this is weakened democracy vis-à-vis the dominion of 
corporations practicing voluntary goodness [43,47]. In the West, agriculture, technological 
innovation and science are promoted with public subsidies in the quest to ameliorate wellbeing 
[162]. Across the various economies of Africa, in most cases corporations ship profits back to 
the home countries [179,180] rather than reinvest to expand the business and create employment 
and knowledge transfer in host countries.  This reinforces the rent-seeking behaviour. It would 
not be preposterous to suggest that since colonialism, there has been a political necessity to 
create a begging group in the global economic system in the periphery in order to maintain the 
status quo and the dominant role of the powerful MNCs [32,58]. This makes all the sense when 
Shamir [156] argues about the corporatization of politics and the moralization of the markets.  
 
Thus, there is a German, Japanese or a Chinese approach to CSR but there is no such thing as 
an African approach to CSR; not even a regional approach because of the different levels of 
institutional maturity. What has become a pattern, however, is the use of philanthropy to 
substitute genuine corporate responsibility across Africa. This reason stems from the fact that 
whereas the former nations are totally influenced by strong internal politics and institutions of 
host countries, the latter are influenced by strong external geopolitical influences in all of their 
industrial compositions. Thus strong institutions translates into strong bargaining power and 
weaker institutions means corporate irresponsibility can thrive as in economic Darwinism.  An 
enduring curtain of protectionism disguised as free trade [162] leads to misplaced solutions 
such as philanthropy. The corrosive power of some corporations has an invisible hand that 
influences politics, thereby producing policies that derail positive change [47], especially in the 
extractive industries. This latter scenario is possible because governments are weak and are 
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therefore complicit in the types of negative outcomes produced within the institutional 
framework. In other words, CSR is what the powerful make it to be. Therefore, what it appears 
to be and what it really is are always in conflict. Consider these problems which have thus far 
been brazenly glossed over because of the institutional void hypothesis. 
 
Practical and policy implications 
Diversion from the original question of economic development is not an insignificant problem 
because it is the root cause of all that is now being reacted to with political CSR. As with errors 
of navigation, pilots and ship captains would be the first to admit that minor deviations can 
bring about unimaginable damage with vast implications. This also applies to economic 
decision and policies enacted by organizations and governments. Much of what is seen as 
humanitarian or charitable gestures sometimes betrays ERWK SULYDWH DQG SXEOLF DFWRUV¶ true 
intentions when scrutiny sheds light on corporate externalities (social and environmental costs). 
 
Notwithstanding their pervasive influence, the material strategies for a change can be quite 
straightforward: 
± If it is more to do with liberalization that has led WRELJEXVLQHVVHV¶WDNH-over of natural 
resources and markets [181] through forced privatization, and control of international 
and national regulations, the solution is clearly neither philanthropy nor fair trade 
products but strong opposition and countervailing power (democracy) by nations to 
oppose such unfairness at the World Trade Organization whilst promoting intra-regional 
trade across Africa. 
± If the problem is poverty alleviation and economic development where there is a lack 
of proper health care systems and other forms of infrastructure, the solution may lie in 
part in the multinationals employing locals, using local content, paying taxes and doing 
things right (being environmentally conscious through processes and designs) as they 
would in the home country²LWLVMXVWPRUDOO\ULJKWLWLVQRWµZHDUHKHOSLQJWKHP¶ 
± If the problem is the so-called institutional void, in the form of lack of enforcement 
mechanisms and fast-track judicial systems, second best institutional approaches are 
always needed [182] where relational approaches work well to reduce transaction costs. 
Thus, promoting civic participation in democracy will also ensure equitable resource 
distribution. Therefore, philanthropy has its place, but clearly not as a substitute for 
genuine corporate responsibility since that creates dependency and long-run under-
development.  
 
Woodson [183] argues that: 
 
History shows that it does not matter who is in power or what revolutionary forces take 
over the government, those who have not learned to do for themselves and have to 
depend solely on others never obtain any more rights or privileges in the end than they 
had in the beginning. 
 
Accordingly, philanthropy as a substitute for genuine responsible organising is not the way 
forward. Further, it is becoming apparent that the idea of philanthropy is clearly not an 
investment but a cost aimed at removing attention away from the main problem which is 
corporate irresponsibility [10,86]. One could simply ask that if there are these deep institutional 
voids, for example in infrastructure and enforcement mechanisms, why does the government 
lack the finances to provide for that? There is the need for an ever-deepening discovery of what 




Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Notwithstanding the important theoretical and managerial implications, there is room for more 
additions beyond what has been espoused here. First of all, it is beyond the scope of a single 
journal article to articulate in full the various impacts of the µSKLODQWKURSL]DWLRQ¶ RI
organizational responsibility towards society and its environment. As such, future studies that 
widen the vista by digging deeper into the effects of philanthropy-based CSR on local 
communities will be a step in the right direction. Studies that demonstrate the extent to which 
gory images of the poor in philanthropy advertisements affect nation branding, country of origin 
of products as well as economic development are encouraged. Moreover, studies that challenge 
this paper by systematically addressing how philanthropy has brought about structural changes 
in the long-term as opposed to sustainable practices and investments in green innovations are 
more than welcome. Most importantly that look at new trade deals between WECS Africa and 
the West (e.g. EU and West Africa) [184] will help understand the changing paradigm from 
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